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Real Acquaintance and Physicalism 
Philip Goff 
I – Real acquaintance versus acquaintance physicalism 
In the old days physicalists refused to compromise. They not only denied the existence of mental 
properties over and above physical properties, but also of mental concepts over and above 
physical/functional concepts. For the old school physicalist mental properties are just physical 
properties we pick out in virtue of their functional role: the concept ‘pain’ picks out c-fibres firing as 
the state that plays ‘the pain role’ in humans. On such a view, zombies are inconceivable and Mary 
learns gains no new propositional knowledge when she sees red for the first time.1  
Physicalists these days tend to be more conciliatory. Those physicalists who adopt the ‘phenomenal 
concepts strategy’ concede to the anti-physicalist that there is a special class of phenomenal 
concepts, formed when conscious states are conceived of in terms of what it’s like to have them,  
which bear no a priori association to physical or causal concepts. The existence of phenomenal 
concepts entails that zombies are conceivable, and that Mary gains new propositional knowledge. 
Despite this concession regarding mental concepts, the phenomenal concepts strategist gives no 
ground on ontology. Although we have two very different kind of concept – physical/functional 
concepts on the one hand, phenomenal concepts on the other – each phenomenal concept co-refers 
with some physical/functional concept: the concept ‘what it’s like to feel pain’ picks out the very 
same state of the world as the concept ‘c-fibres firing.’ Because phenomenal concepts refer to 
physical states, zombies are impossible. And Mary’s new knowledge is just a matter of her gaining a 
new way of thinking about a property she already knew about under a physical description. Mary 
used to know that seeing red involves ‘physical property P,’ now she knows that seeing red involves 
‘phenomenal quality Q,’ but ‘physical property P’ and ‘phenomenal property Q’ are just two ways of 
thinking about the same thing. In general, to adopt the phenomenal concepts strategy is to accept 
that there is an epistemic gap between the mental and the physical, but to account for it in terms of 
a dualism of concepts rather than of properties.2  
                                                          
1
 Armstrong 1968, Dretske 1995, Harman 1990, Lewis 1966, 1970, 1994, Rey 1995.  
2
 Black and Stalnaker 1999, Hill 1997, Hill and McLaughlin 1998, Levine 1983, Loar 1990, 2003, Papineau 1993 
2002, Perry 2001.  
All versions of the phenomenal concepts strategy agree with the anti-physicalist that there is no a 
priori association between phenomenal concepts and physical/functional concepts, and hence that 
the phenomenal facts are not a priori entailed by the physical facts. But a subclass of phenomenal 
concepts strategists want to go further, to have a view of the working of phenomenal concepts 
which more closely resembles that of the dualist. Specifically, these physicalists want to agree with 
the standard dualist position that we are ‘acquainted’ with our phenomenal qualities, that is, that 
we refer to the qualities of our experience in virtue of standing in some special, epistemically 
intimate relationship to those qualities. Call this kind of view ‘acquaintance physicalism.’  
There is a natural sense of the word ‘acquaintance’, according to which acquaintance affords the 
acquainted an understanding of the real nature of the thing with which she is acquainted. Call 
acquaintance so understood ‘real acquaintance.’ Something like real acquaintance was taken by the 
British Empiricists to hold between a mind and its ideas, and by the sense data theorists to hold 
between the self and its sense data. It is a familiar and intuitive idea in the history of philosophy that 
the mind is somehow ‘so close’ to the qualities of experience that their nature is ‘laid bare’ to the 
thinker. 
On the face of it physicalism – at least the kind of physicalism adopted by proponents of the 
phenomenal concepts strategy, from now on ‘PCS physicalism’ – cannot consistently believe that we 
bear the real acquaintance to our phenomenal qualities. For physicalists take the real nature of 
phenomenal qualities to be physical or functional. If this were the case, then a really acquaintance 
with our phenomenal qualities would allow us to discern their real physical nature. Attending to pain 
would reveal it to consist of c-fibre stimulation. There would not be, contrary to what the PCS 
physicalist supposes, an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal.  
This much seems to be conceded by the acquaintance physicalists. Katalin Balog, who gives a 
detailed exposition and defence of a form of acquaintance physicalism, says that with respect to 
phenomenal qualities we have a ‘direct, unmediated, substantial insight into their nature’ (2012, 17). 
However, she also says that ‘this kind direct insight…does not reveal anything about the 
metaphysical nature of phenomenality’ (2012, 18). So whatever Balog means by ‘substantial’, it does 
not involve knowing the real nature of the object of thought. David Papineau, one of the original 
proponents of acquaintance physicalism (although he never actually used the word ‘acquaintance’ in 
expounding his view), makes it clear that there is no basic mode of thought which affords us an 
understanding of the real nature of the thing thought about: 
No doubt there are ways of thinking of things that make certain essential 
properties a priori knowable. But I take such a priori knowledge to derive 
from (possibly implicit) compositionality in the relevant modes of thinking, 
and so not to be associated with the most basic ways in which thought 
makes contact with reality....When it comes to these basic points of 
contact, I find it hard to take seriously any alternative to the assumption 
that our atomic concepts are related to reality by facts external to our a 
priori grasp, such as causal or historical facts. (Papineau 2006: 102) 
In place of real acquaintance, acquaintance physicalists give a constitutional account of a certain 
subclass of phenomenal concepts, according to which those phenomenal concepts refer to 
phenomenal qualities in virtue of being partly constituted by those qualities. When I am in agony, 
and I deploy a phenomenal concept to think about my agony, that concept, and the thought it is 
involved in, are literally constituted by the feeling of agony itself.3  
We can understand this view by analogy with quotation marks. When we put quotation marks 
around a word, we create something that refers to a word by containing that word as a part. For 
example, the term ‘dog’ refers to a certain three letter word of the English language, and it does so 
by containing that word within itself. We can think of phenomenal concept as ‘quoting’ the 
phenomenal qualities they refer to, on the constitutional account. This model is not – at least not 
obviously – inconsistent with physicalism: the phenomenal quality ‘quoted’ may be a physical 
property, even though it is not revealed as such to the concept user. 
Acquaintance physicalists do not give a constitutional account of all phenomenal concepts, but only 
of ‘direct’ phenomenal concepts: one deploys a direct phenomenal concept when one thinks about a 
given phenomenal quality by attending to it and thinking about it in terms of what it’s like to have 
it.4 Having formed a direct phenomenal concept of a certain kind of pain, I can then go on to judge 
that other people feel that way, or that I felt that way yesterday, and such judgements can clearly 
take place in the absence of pain (otherwise, one could not think that someone was in agony 
without feeling agony oneself). Indeed, arguably Mary in her black and white room has a concept of 
what it’s like to see red in virtue of being in a linguistic community with people who have that 
concept.5 But only a subject currently experiencing phenomenal quality Q can form a direct 
phenomenal concept of Q.   
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Of course, we cannot refute physicalism by just defining a notion inconsistent with it and calling it 
‘real.’ However, I think we have good reason to think that we are really acquainted with our 
phenomenal qualities, and that this in turn gives us good reason to think the conceptual dualism 
advocated by the phenomenal concepts strategists is inconsistent with a physicalist ontology. In the 
remainder of this paper I will (i) offer a detailed characterisation of real acquaintance, (ii) argue for 
the real instantiation of real acquaintance so characterised, (iii) present an argument against 
physicalism which starts from the premise that we are really acquainted with our phenomenal 
qualities. 
II – An account of real acquaintance 
(In this section I will assume my view is true in order to vividly characterise it. In the next section I 
shall argue that it is true). 
Real acquaintance is a natural relation which a subject bears to each of its phenomenal qualities. It is 
a special kind of intimacy in virtue of which the following two facts obtain: 
Revelation – A psychologically normal subject can come to know the real 
nature of one of her phenomenal qualities by attending to that quality.   
Phenomenal Certainty – A psychologically normal subject is able to put 
herself into a situation in which, with respect to one of her phenomenal 
qualities, she is justified in being certain that that quality is instantiated 
(where to be certain that P is roughly to believe with a credence of 1 
that P).  
A bird is really acquainted with its phenomenal qualities, but, being unable to attend to them, has no 
grip on their nature, and is unable to form beliefs about its phenomenal qualities. At all times I am 
really acquainted with each of my phenomenal qualities, but most of the time I as it were ‘look 
through’ my phenomenal qualities to the features of the world they represent. When perceiving a 
red bus I attend not to what it’s like to see red, but to the red quality of the bus itself. However, an 
advantage humans have over birds is that, with a slight mental effort, they are able to attend to and 
think about their experiences. Certain experiences, such as pain, anxiety, after images, are more apt 
for this kind of reflection. And when I attend to my phenomenal qualities, their real nature is directly 
revealed to me in such a way that I am justified in not entertaining the slightest doubt concerning 
their instantiation.  
What is the ‘real nature’ of pain? It is clearly not the case that all the properties of pain are revealed 
to me when I attend to it. Pain might be instantiated a certain number of times in the world, but I 
am not aware of how many when I attend to my headache. A more plausible suggestion would be 
that at all necessary properties of pain constitute its real nature. But even this is too much. Pain is 
necessarily such that 100x127=12,700, but it is not plausible that this is revealed to me when I 
attend to a throbbing in my shin. 
Kit Fine distinguishes the modal conception of essence popular in contemporary metaphysics, 
according to which an essential property of X is a property X has in all possible worlds, from a 
definitional conception of essence, according to which an essential property of X is one that 
constitutes the real definition of X, that is, one that makes X the kind of thing it is.6 Fine takes the 
notion of a real definition as primitive, but thinks it one we easily get a grip on by consideration of 
cases. In all possible worlds in which Socrates exists, he has the property of being either Socrates or 
the Eiffel Tower. But the property of being either Socrates or the Eiffel Tower does not plausibly 
contribute to making Socrates the kind of thing he is. The property of being human is a more 
plausible candidate. All properties that constitute the real definition of a thing are properties that a 
thing has necessarily, but the converse is not the case. 
To make sense of the ‘real nature’ or ‘essence’ or pain, we need to be working with a Finean rather 
than a modal conception of essence. Pain is a property rather than an object, but it seems even 
more plausible in the case of properties that they have something like a real definition or nature. 
This is not to say that a property has some other property, which is its nature, as talk of properties 
‘having a real nature’ might superficially suggest. Rather, regarding each property P, there is 
something to be understood regarding P, the understanding of which constitutes knowing what it is 
for P to be instantiated. Consider the property of sphericity. In knowing that for something to be 
spherical is for it to have all points on its surface equidistant from its centre, I know what it is for 
sphericity to be instantiated.  
It is difficult to put the point unambiguously. With regards to any property one has a concept of, 
there is a sense in which one ‘knows what it is for the property to be instantiated.’ Suppose Jim has 
an indexical concept of the property of being gold. That indexical concept does not afford Jim an 
understanding of the real nature of that property. And yet there is a sense in which Jim can truly say, 
‘Of course I know what it is for something to be that stuff: it is for it to be that stuff’, where he 
specifies by demonstration the condition an object must satisfy in order to count as gold. 
However, perhaps even more so than in Fine’s discussion of the real nature of objects, consideration 
of cases shows that there is a perfectly clear notion here. Suppose David and I are playing a fun 
game called ‘Guess my favourite property.’ I am trying to guess David’s favourite property, which 
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turns out to be sphericity. Contrast my understanding of David’s favourite property before he tells 
me what it is – when I can only think of it as ‘David’s favourite property’ – and my understanding of 
David’s favourite property after he tells me it’s sphericity. There is a clear sense in which I go from 
not knowing what the property in question is, to knowing what the property in question is.  
Now, when I’m still guessing I could always be clever and say, ‘Of course I know which property 
we’re talking about: it’s David’s favourite property.’ If I use the phrase ‘David’s favourite property’ as 
a rigid designator, then I am able to refer to the property in question (I pick it out in all possible 
worlds!). But it is only when I able to think of it in geometrical terms that I grasp its nature, that I 
understand what it is for an object to have that property. The notion of a real nature is closely linked 
to the notion of a transparent concept that I have developed in other work; roughly a transparent 
concept is one that renders a priori accessible the real nature of its referent.7  
Talk of ‘knowing what it is for a property to be instantiated’ suggests that properties are universals. 
But I take it that this kind of talk is a consistent with nominalism at a more fundamental level of 
analysis. If we identify properties with sets of tropes, then we can say that real acquaintance with a 
pain trope affords an understanding of what it is for a certain trope to be a pain trope. Even the 
austere nominalist, who at a fundamental level of analysis quantifies only over particular objects, 
can arguably analyse this notion. She can say that a pained subject, in virtue of being pain-
acquainted, is afforded an understanding of what it is for her to be pained.8 
As long as there’s something to be understood about an object that constitutes knowing what it is 
about an object that fits it to satisfy some predicate ‘N’, then we can give some kind of analysis of 
talk of ‘the real nature of property N-ness’ whatever our ultimate metaphysics. There are perhaps 
some very austere forms of concept nominalism, according to which reality just consists of 
characterless blobs, which predicates apply to only as a result of our interests. Blobby nominalism of 
this kind could provide no analysis of talk of the real nature of properties.9 But blobby nominalism of 
this kind is not very plausible. Surely it is a mind-independent fact that the planet Earth is such as to 
satisfy the predicate ‘roughly spherical,’ and we can understand how the Earth can be such as to 
satisfy this predicate, even if its being so isn’t a matter of the Earth’s instantiating a certain universal. 
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 One could give a meta-linguistic analysis of what it is in general to ‘know what it is for a property to be 
instantiated.’ I shall not attempt to do this here. 
9
 Armstrong equates all forms of austere nominalism with blobby nominalism. However, if the austere 
nominalist takes it to be a fundamental fact about the world that objects are propertied, then, despite not 
believing in properties, she has a non-blobby picture of the world. Devitt (1980) and Lewis (1983) have argued 
contra Armstrong for the tenability of this kind of position. The austere nominalist who believes that objects 
are propertied has a more ideologically expansive view that the blobby austere nominalist, despite not having 
a more ontologically expansive view. 
Our fundamental metaphysics will make a difference, though, to what kind of things we may take 
the objects of real acquaintance to be. If we take properties to be Aristotelian universals, then we 
can say that it is the in res universal of pain with which I am acquainted, and which I thereby 
understand the real nature of. But on other views, it seems we cannot be acquainted with the 
property itself.  For the Platonist, the universal of pain is outside of space and time. The austere 
nominalist and the trope theorist either do not believe in the universal of pain, or identify it with the 
set of pained things/pain tropes. In all these cases, it is difficult to see how we could make sense of 
the subject bearing a natural relation to pain. But in each case I think there is a natural candidate for 
the object of acquaintance.  
The Plantonist can say that the subject is acquainted with the state of affairs of her instantiating the 
universal of pain, and thereby understands the real nature of that universal. The trope theorist can 
say that the subject is acquainted with a pain trope, and thereby understands what it is for a trope 
to be a pain trope. The austere nominalist can say that the subject is acquainted with itself at a time 
when it is pained, and in virtue of this acquaintance knows what it is for a subject to be pained. 
Unless the trope or the particular object (at a given time) in question is blobby, there will be a way of 
understanding how the trope/object is such as to satisfy the relevant predicate, and we may 
suppose that such understanding can come from a real acquaintance with the trope/particular 
object at a time.1011   
The final point I want to make about real acquaintance is crucial. Real acquaintance is not defined as 
the relation that guarantees the Revelation and Phenomenal Certainty. The concept of real 
acquaintance is a primitive notion, but one that turns out to necessarily have these implications. One 
might suspect I was cooking up this notion, where it not so intuitive, and so familiar from the history 
of philosophy. One easily latches onto the idea that one is ‘so close’ to one’s experiences that their 
nature is laid bare and their instantiation certain. This is not to say that such we really do stand in 
such a relation to our phenomenal qualities. My point is just that it is not plausible for my opponents 
to claim they haven’t the slightest idea what I’m talking about.  
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 To say that we are acquainted with ‘a particular object at time t’ is not to say that we are acquainted with t. 
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as it is an objective fact about the world that it is pained at the time of acquaintance (which wouldn’t be the 
case if the subject were blobby). 
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  I am grateful to Mike Martin for prompting me to think more carefully about the metaphysics of real 
acquaintance. 
III – An argument for real acquaintance 
Why should we believe that we are really acquainted with our phenomenal qualities?  One reason is 
that we seem to be. The fact that there seems to be a table in front of me gives me some reason to 
believe that there is a table in front of me. The fact that I seem to stand a peculiar type of intimate 
relationship with my pain such that its nature is directly revealed to me in such a way that I can be 
rationally certain of its instantiation, gives me some reason to believe that I really do stand in that 
relationship with my pain. 
There is a further to believe in real acquaintance: the hypothesis that I am really acquainted with my 
phenomenal qualities explains a couple of very plausible theses about our epistemic situation with 
regards to phenomenal qualities: phenomenal certainty and phenomenal insight:  
Phenomenal certainty – A psychologically normal subject is able to put 
herself into a situation in which, with respect to one of her phenomenal 
qualities, she is justified in feeling certain that that quality is instantiated 
(where to be certain that P is roughly to believe with a credence of 1 
that P).  
Phenomenal Insight – We have rich a priori knowledge concerning our 
phenomenal qualities.   
Phenomenal certainty 
We have already across Phenomenal Certainty in characterising real acquaintance. But it is an 
incredibly plausible thesis in its own right. Consider the following case. Suppose I am in agony, 
having just had my leg cut off. I attend to my agony, think about it in terms of how it feels thereby 
forming a phenomenal concept of the agony, and then deploy that phenomena concept in judging 
that I am feeling like that (‘like that’ expresses the phenomenal concept). In normal circumstances, I 
can rule out any scenario in which that judgement is not true; I am justified in believing with total 
certainty that I feel that way.  
This is not a kind of certainty we are capable of having regarding states of the external world.  I have 
a justified belief that there is laptop in front of me. That belief has a very high level of justification. It 
has enough justification to count as knowledge. Nonetheless, I am not justified in being certain that 
there is a laptop in front of me, as there is a very small chance I am in The Matrix, and what seems 
like a visual experience of a laptop is in fact an elaborate hallucination created in my mind by evil 
computers. 
I am not saying that every time we form a phenomenal concept, we achieve rational certainty that 
the concept is satisfied. And I’m not saying we never make mistakes about our conscious experience. 
I’m just claiming that there are certain, quite familiar, circumstances in which such rational certainty 
is achieved regarding a judgement about phenomenal qualities, and that a normal human being is 
able to create such circumstances for herself.  
It would be good to have a method for distinguishing the cases where certainty is reached from the 
cases where it isn’t, and I am broadly sympathetic to that proposed by David Chalmers (2003). 
However, one doesn’t need to do this work in order to accept phenomenal certainty. I take it as a 
datum that there are commonplace circumstances in which I have certainty regarding the 
instantiation of certain qualities in my conscious experience. 
Phenomenal insight 
Phenomenal insight is the thesis that we have a priori knowledge of certain essential features of 
phenomenal states. Most uncontroversially, we can know a priori essential resemblances and 
differences between phenomenal qualities, for example, what it’s like to see red is similar to what 
it’s like to see orange. It is also plausible that we know a priori that pain is ceteris paribus a bad 
thing: I can move a priori from the fact that φing will cause someone to feel like that to the fact that 
I have strong reason not to φ. Another plausible example: we can know a priori the representational 
properties of phenomenal qualities, for example, the phenomenal concept formed when I attend to 
my visual experience of seeing a tomato characterises it as an experience as of a red, round thing. In 
order to avoid getting into more controversy that is necessary, I’ll stick to the case of essential 
similarities and differences between phenomenal qualities.  
One might agree that we have knowledge of essential similarities between our conscious states, but 
be reluctant to class this knowledge as a priori. One’s reasoning might be that we know such facts 
through the faculty of introspection, which makes it natural to class this knowledge as a posteriori. 
According to this line of reasoning, introspective knowledge is a kind of sensory knowledge 
accumulated through an inner sense.  
However, the fact that this knowledge comes from introspection does not entail that it is a 
posteriori, because introspection and phenomenal concepts are essentially bound up with each 
other. We form phenomenal concepts through introspecting our phenomenal qualities. We can’t go 
from the fact that we know a truth about phenomenal qualities through introspection to the fact 
that that truth is a posteriori, as we may well use introspection to form the relevant phenomenal 
concepts, and thereby discern the truth from the concepts.  
The way to decide whether these truths are a priori is to ask whether or not their negations are 
conceivable. If the negation of a given proposition is inconceivable, it follows that its falsity can be 
ruled out by mere reflection of concepts. If both the truth and the falsity of a given proposition are 
conceivable, it follows that we are reliant on some faculty to work out which is the case, and hence 
the resulting knowledge is a posteriori. It is overwhelmingly plausible with regards to the 
propositions under consideration that their negations are inconceivable: we cannot conceive of a 
situation where phenomenal red is more similar to phenomenal green than it is to phenomenal 
orange. I conclude, therefore, that we have a priori knowledge in this case, and that phenomenal 
insight is true.  
Real acquaintance, phenomenal certainty and phenomenal insight 
Intuitively we stand in a peculiarly intimate relationship with our phenomenal qualities in virtue of 
which phenomenal certainty and revelation are true. Supposing that things are as they seem to be in 
this respect allows us to explain phenomenal certainty and phenomenal insight. It is of course part of 
the basic characterisation of real acquaintance that it grounds phenomenal certainty. And we can 
explain phenomenal insight by saying that, in virtue of a real acquaintance with phenomenal red and 
phenomenal orange, the subject understands the real nature of each of those qualities, and it is 
thereby apparent that the two qualities have a similar nature. This might be understood analogously 
to our knowledge that triangularity and trilaterality are necessarily co-extensive. I know what it is for 
an object to have three sides, I know what it is for an object to have three angles, and it is thereby 
apparent to me that those two properties must go together. (I am not saying that we are really 
acquainted with these geometrical properties; the cases are analogous only in the sense that in both 
cases we have knowledge grounded in an understanding of real natures.)  
The fact that the real acquaintance naturally and intuitively explains these facts about epistemic 
situation gives us reason to believe in it. Our reason to believe in real acquaintance is somewhat 
similar to our reason to believe in the external world. We are justified in believing in the external 
world because (i) there seems to be an external world, (ii) supposing that in this respect things are as 
they seem to be explains the structure and coherence of our experience. We are justified in 
believing that we are really acquainted with our phenomenal qualities because (i) we seem to be 
really acquainted with our phenomenal qualities, (ii) suppose that in this respect things are as they 
seem to be explains two extremely plausible theses concerning our relationship to our conscious 
experience: phenomenal certainty and phenomenal insight. 
How strong these reasons to believe in real acquaintance are will depend on the prospects for an 
alternative explanation of phenomenal certainty and phenomenal insight (just as the strength of our 
reasons for believing in the external world depends on the prospects for alternative explanations of 
the structure and coherence of our experience, for example, idealism). If we have two equally good 
explanations of phenomenal certainty and phenomenal insight, and only one of them is consistent 
with physicalism, then those who take themselves to have good reason to believe physicalism will 
take themselves to have good reason to favour the explanation consistent with physicalism. I will 
now argue that the prospects for the CPS physicalist providing such an explanation are bleak. 
Can the physicalist explain phenomenal certainty and a phenomenal insight?  
I will try to show that there is a form of the phenomenal concepts strategy that can account for 
phenomenal certainty (or something like it), and that there is a form of the phenomenal concepts 
strategy that can account for phenomenal insight, but that there is no form of the phenomenal 
concepts strategy that can account for both phenomenal certainty and phenomenal insight. Indeed, I 
will give reasons for thinking that no form of PCS physicalism could account for both of these theses.  
A physicalist account of phenomenal certainty 
Proponents of acquaintance physicalism can account for the infallibility of certain phenomenal 
judgements. According to the acquaintance physicalist, a direct phenomenal concept of pain 
involves within its constitution the feeling of pain it refers to. Any subject judging that she is in pain 
by employing a direct phenomenal concept of pain must therefore be in pain: she must be feeling 
pain in order for that pain to constitute the direct phenomenal concept. Such a judgement, 
therefore, cannot fail to be true.12  
I am not sure that this kind of infallibility can give us rational certainty. It is one thing to think that a 
judgement cannot fail to be true; it is another thing to think I can be justified in not entertaining any 
doubt about the judgement. To have rational certainty that p, a subject has to be in position to rule 
out any scenario where p fails to be the case. Merely having a belief that cannot fail to be true does 
not entail that a subject is able to do this. However, I shall set this worry on one side, and suppose 
that the acquaintance physicalist has the resources to account for phenomenal certainty. 
Whilst acquaintance physicalism may be in a good position with respect to phenomenal certainty, 
the same cannot be said of phenomenal insight. There are broadly speaking two ways in which it can 
be a priori that a certain description D (non-trivially) truly applies to a certain referent R thought 
about under concept C. Firstly, it could be the case that in deploying C we pick out R as ‘the actual 
D,’ thus rendering it inconceivable that R thought of under C is not actually D. For example, we think 
about Julius as ‘the actual inventor of the zip,’ and thereby render it inconceivable that Julius is not 
the actual inventor of the zip.13 Secondly, it might be that, in deploying C we pick out R in virtue of 
being really acquainted with R, and our real acquaintance with R makes it apparent to us that D truly 
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describes the real nature of R, or some fact that follows from the real nature of R. For example, I 
might be really acquainted with phenomenal red, and really acquainted with phenomenal orange, 
and through grasping the real nature of these qualities it is apparent to me that phenomenal red 
satisfies the description ‘has a similar nature to phenomenal orange.’  
I can see no other way in which are substantive a priori knowledge concerning phenomenal qualities 
could be accounted for. Certainly we could not have such knowledge if the entity is thought of under 
a radically opaque concept, that is, a concept such that reference is wholly determined by facts 
which are not a priori accessible.14 Some entity referred to under a radically opaque concept might 
be associated by thinkers with a certain description.  For example, even if the reference of ‘John’ is 
determined by causal facts outside the head, it might be that speakers in our community associate 
the name ‘John’ with the description ‘a cad not to be trusted.’ However, because this description is 
not involved in reference-fixing, it will always be conceivable that it does not apply to John. This isn’t 
a case of a priori knowledge; it’s just a bad reputation.15 
In order to account for our a priori knowledge of phenomenal qualities, phenomenal concepts would 
have to refer either by description or by real acquaintance. The acquaintance physicalist can take 
neither of these options. A phenomenal concept, on her view, picks out its referent not by 
description, but in virtue of being partly constituted by the referent. And this constitution relation 
between concept and quality cannot result in the subject’s having real acquaintance with the quality, 
as real acquaintance is inconsistent with PCS physicalism (I will argue for this more thoroughly 
below). Therefore, the acquaintance physicalist is unable to account for phenomenal insight. 
A physicalist account of phenomenal insight 
Most forms of the phenomenal concepts strategy seem to construe phenomenal concepts as 
radically opaque. It is causal connections, or facts about the natural functions or material 
constitution of phenomenal concepts, which hook the subject up to its phenomenal qualities, not 
descriptions which are a priori available to the subject. Janet Levin and Robert Schroer, however, 
have proposed theories of phenomenal concepts according to which they are hybrids of descriptive 
and radically opaque sub-concepts.16  
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Levin’s view mingles elements of analytic functionalism and the phenomenal concepts strategy. The 
reference of a phenomenal concept is determined in two distinct ways. On the one hand, a 
phenomenal concept picks out a conscious state by characterising it in causal-functional terms 
and/or in terms of the similarities and differences between phenomenal qualities. On the other 
hand, a phenomenal concept picks out a state by being causally connected to that state in the right 
kind of way. This makes reference a little precarious, as both of these reference-fixing routes must 
be successful for the phenomenal concept to refer. If the phenomenal concept fails to be causally 
connected in the right way to anything, or if the thing the phenomenal concept is causally connected 
to doesn’t have the relevant causal-functional/similarity properties, then reference fails. 
Schroer thinks that phenomenal concepts are descriptive concepts that pick out conscious states in 
terms of their mode of composition from more basic phenomenal elements. The concept 
‘phenomenal orange 7’, for example, characterises its referent as being composed of phenomenal 
red hue and phenomenal yellow hue, as well as some specific degree of phenomenal saturation and 
phenomenal lightness. But the sub-concepts referring to the phenomenal elements are radically 
opaque: reference to phenomenal elements is determined by causal facts outside of what is a priori 
accessible. For Schroer, the phenomenal elements turn out to refer to physical properties, and 
hence the conscious state out of which the phenomenal elements are composed turns out to be a 
composite physical state. Zombies are nonetheless conceivable, as there is no a priori information in 
the sub-concepts which would allow us to know that they refer to physical properties. 
Both of these hybrid views can account for phenomenal insight, or at least our a priori knowledge of 
similarities and resemblances amongst phenomenal states. On Schroer’s view it is stipulated by the 
description that determines the reference of ‘phenomenal orange 7’ that the state denoted involves 
phenomenal red hue, and it is stipulated by the description that determines reference of 
‘phenomenal red 8’ that the state denoted involves phenomenal red hue. In virtue of this we can 
know a priori that these two qualities share a common element and thus resemble. On Levin’s view 
the similarity is built directly into the descriptions.  
However, neither view can account for phenomenal certainty. Suppose though introspection I am 
aware of a phenomenal quality which presents itself as falling under the concept ‘phenomenal 
orange.’ Assuming that quality is phenomenal orange, it is a priori that it resembles phenomenal red. 
But how do I know that that quality I am aware of is phenomenal orange? Neither Schroer nor Levin 
fill in the details, but presumably there must be some reliable sub-personal mechanism that gathers 
information about the quality, and ensures that I deploy the correct phenomenal concept, i.e. 
‘phenomenal orange’ rather than ‘phenomenal green’, ‘pain’, or ‘anxiety.’  
This puts introspective beliefs about phenomenal qualities in the same epistemological boat as 
ordinary perceptual beliefs: reliant on the proper functioning of an information-gathering 
mechanism. My belief that there is a table in front of me is reliant for its truth on the proper 
functioning of my senses. Similarly, for Schorer and Levin, my judgement that I am experiencing 
phenomenal orange (as opposed to phenomenal green, pain, or anxiety) must be dependent on the 
proper functioning of some information-gathering mechanism involved in introspection. They are 
unable, therefore, to explain why the belief that I am not currently experiencing phenomenal orange 
is not subject to doubt in the way that my belief that there is a table in front of me is. 
Physicalism can’t account for both phenomenal certainty and phenomenal 
insight 
In summary, we can offer the following argument against the possibility of a form of PCS physicalism 
which accounts for both phenomenal certainty and phenomenal insight: 
1. We pick out qualities in our experience in one of the following ways (A) by being really 
acquainted with those qualities, (B) by description, (C) with radically opaque concepts, (D) 
with some hybrid of descriptive and radically opaque sub-concepts.   
2. The PCS physicalist cannot go for option (A). 
3. If the PCS physicalist goes for options (B) or (D) then she cannot account for phenomenal 
certainty. 
4. If the PCS physicalist goes for option (C), then she cannot account for phenomenal insight. 
5. Therefore, the physicalist cannot account for both phenomenal certainty and phenomenal 
insight. 
Objection: Semi-acquaintance 
Real acquaintance is defined as an all or nothing matter, in the sense that the complete nature of 
the object of acquaintance is revealed to the subject of acquaintance. But is there not logical space 
for a kind of relation between thinker and property that yields the thinker a partial grasp of the 
nature of the property thought about? Perhaps the physicalist could explain phenomenal certainty 
and phenomenal insight in terms of a commitment to semi-acquaintance, defined as a special kind of 
intimacy between a subject and its phenomenal qualities in virtue of which the following two theses 
are true: 
Semi-Revelation – A psychologically normal subject can come to know 
some aspect of the real nature of one of her phenomenal qualities by 
attending to that quality.   
Phenomenal Certainty – A psychologically normal subject is able to put 
herself into a situation in which, with respect to one of her phenomenal 
qualities, she is justified in being certain that that quality is instantiated 
(where to be certain that P is roughly to believe with a credence of 1 
that P).  
Obviously such a relation would account for phenomenal certainty. And the proponent of semi-
acquaintance could perhaps account for phenomenal insight in terms of the partial grasp of the 
nature of phenomenal qualities afforded to us by the obtaining of semi-revelation. 
It is important to note that semi-acquaintance can be of help to the physicalist only if it is of a very 
specific kind. In many cases, an aspect of a physical property is a physical property. Suppose pain 
were the combination of c-fibre and d-fibre stimulation. If a semi-acquaintance with pain revealed to 
us that pain involved c-fibre stimulation, this would be enough to make it a priori that pain is 
physical, contrary to what the PCS physicalist supposes. 
In order to maintain the conceptual independence of the phenomenal and the physical, the PCS 
physicalist would have to suppose that semi-acquaintance affords us an understanding of merely 
structural or functional properties of phenomenal qualities. We can note that the facts about 
phenomenology that Levin and Schroer think are a priori available are all of this kind. Schroer thinks 
we can know a priori certain facts about the internal structure of phenomenal qualities. Levin thinks 
that we can know a priori certain causal and resemblance facts concerning phenomenal qualities. By 
restricting our a priori knowledge of phenomenal qualities to facts about structure or causal roles, it 
remains opaque whether or not phenomenal qualities are physical. 
It seems that for semi-acquaintance to help the PCS physicalist it would have to be structural semi-
acquaintance, defined as a special kind of intimacy between subjects and their phenomenal qualities 
in virtue of which the following two theses are true: 
Structural Semi-Revelation – A psychologically normal subject can come 
to know certain facts about the internal structure and/or causal role of 
that quality. 
Phenomenal Certainty – A psychologically normal subject is able to put 
herself into a situation in which, with respect to one of her phenomenal 
qualities, she is justified in being certain that that quality is instantiated 
(where to be certain that P is roughly to believe with a credence of 1 
that P).  
I submit that we have no intuitive grip on the notion of semi-acquaintance (of which structural-
acquaintance is a kind). We can of course stipulatively define the notion. But there is a kind of 
disunity between the two aspects of its characterisation, which can be appreciated by comparison 
with the notion of real acquaintance. The idea of real acquaintance is the idea of a certain kind of 
intimacy between a subject and each of its phenomenal qualities, in virtue of which (i) a normal 
subject can know the nature of those qualities, (ii) a normal subject can come to be rationally certain 
that those qualities are instantiated. The two aspects of the characterisation of real acquaintance 
are unified around this particular notion of intimacy.  
I would ask the proponent of semi-revelation whether or not on her view, for any given subject S 
and an arbitrary one its phenomenal qualities Q, S is intimate with the whole of Q, or with only one 
aspect of Q, call it A. There are two possible answers to this question: 
Option 1 – S is intimate only with A, and that’s why she can only 
understand the nature of A, not the nature of the whole of Q. The 
problem with this option is that it’s unclear how we can explain the fact 
that (in normal circumstances) S can be rationally certain that the whole 
of Q is instantiated, not merely that A is instantiated. A normal individual 
in agony can know for certain that she is in agony, not merely that some 
aspect of her agony is instantiated. 
Options 2 – S is intimate with the whole of Q, and can thereby be 
rationally certain that the whole of Q is instantiated. The trouble with 
this option is that it’s unclear why S can come to know only an aspect of 
Q, rather than the whole of Q. 
There seems no non-arbitrary way of deciding which of the above options the proponent of semi-
acquaintance ought to go for. And the fact that it’s not clear how to spell out the details in this 
respect suggests that the notion of semi-acquaintance is cooked up rather than part of the way 
things pre-theoretically seem to be 
There might be a concern that I am putting too much weight on what we intuitively have a grip on. 
But whilst the argument for real acquaintance must begin with how things intuitively are – intuitively 
I am epistemically intimate with my pain such that its nature is directly revealed to me in such a way 
that its instantiation is beyond rational doubt – it does not end there. There are very plausible theses 
about our epistemic situation, namely phenomenal insight and phenomenal certainty that are 
straightforwardly explained by this intuitive way things seem to be; and this gives us strong reason 
to believe that, in this case, the way things intuitively seem to be is the way things really are.  
There is a more straightforward reason why the physicalist is going to find it difficult to make use of 
semi-acquaintance, which arises when we appreciate that doing so would require giving a 
physicalistic account of the semi-acquaintance relation. The physicalist cannot just take semi-
acquaintance to be a primitive relation; rather she must give some physicalist account of it, 
explaining it in more fundamental terms.  
Given that semi-acquaintance is characterised in terms of semi-revelation and phenomenal certainty, 
giving a physicalist account of semi-acquaintance will involve giving a physicalist account of semi-
revelation and phenomenal certainty. And for similar reasons to those discussed in detail above, it is 
hard to see how the physicalist could account for both semi-revelation and phenomenal certainty. 
She might explain semi-revelation with reference to some descriptivist account along the lines of 
Levin and Schroer; but that will leave her unable to explain phenomenal certainty. She might explain 
phenomenal certainty by giving some acquaintance physicalist model, along the lines of Balog and 
Papineau; but that will leave her unable to explain semi-acquaintance. Once we realise that the 
physicalist can’t take the semi-acquaintance relation as primitive, we can see that it offers no help at 
all.  
(IV) – The acquaintance argument against physicalism 
Now that we have support for the thesis that we are really acquainted with our phenomenal 
qualities, I can turn to the argument against physicalism itself: 
Premise 1 – We are really acquainted with our phenomenal qualities. 
Premise 2 – If (i) we are really acquainted with our phenomenal 
qualities, and (ii) our phenomenal qualities had a real physical/functional 
nature, then (iii) the real physical/functional nature of our phenomenal 
qualities would be accessible through introspection. 
Premise 3 – It is not the case that there is a real physical/functional 
nature of our phenomenal qualities accessible through introspection. 
Conclusion – Our phenomenal qualities do not have a real 
physical/functional nature, and therefore physicalism is false. 
 
Old school physicalists, such as analytic functionalists, may dispute premise 3, claiming it to be a 
priori that phenomenal qualities are certain causal role properties. I will not here argue against such 
views; my main target in this paper is PCS physicalism, which I take to be the view that (i) each 
phenomenal quality has a real physical/functional nature, (ii) the nature of phenomenal concepts 
entails an epistemic gap between phenomenal qualities phenomenally conceived, and phenomenal 
qualities conceived of in terms of their real physical/functional nature. Such physicalists are 
committed to premise 3.  
One view I certainly do not intend to argue against is Russellian monism. Galen Strawson calls himself 
a ‘physicalist’, but thinks that the real nature of fundamental physical entities is, at least in part, 
experiential. Physics characterises properties in terms of their causal role: negative charge is 
whatever property plays the negative charge role, mass is whatever property plays the mass role. 
According to Strawson, the properties which turn out to play those roles, and hence turn out to be 
negative charge and mass, are at least in part, experiential. These fundamental forms of experience 
come together in the brain to constitute the conscious experience we associate with organisms.17  
Strawson can, and I think would, agree that we are really acquainted with our phenomenal qualities. 
When I attend to my pain, its real ‘physical’ nature (according to Strawson’s use of the word 
‘physical’) is revealed to me, as how pain feels just is its real ‘physical’ nature, the real nature of that 
property we pick out by its causal role when we think of it as ‘c-fibres firing’. Strawson’s 
panpsychism is a form of Russellian monism, which I take to be the view that the real nature of (at 
least some of) the properties denoted by fundamental physics are phenomenal or 
protophenomenal, where protophenomenal properties are properties which are not phenomenal 
but (in certain combinations) a priori entail the existence of phenomenal properties, without doing 
so merely in virtue of realising structural/functional properties.18 Any Russellian monist who takes 
the real nature of c-fibres firing to be experiential, and chooses to call this nature ‘physical’, can also 
accept that we are really acquainted with the real ‘physical’ nature of c-fibres firing.  
I take it that there is no privileged definition of ‘physical’ or ‘physicalism’ out there for us to discover. 
There are a number of ways in which we might define the word ‘physicalism’, and our choice should 
be shaped by pragmatic considerations. I prefer not to call Strawson’s view ‘physicalism’, simply 
because the sides of the debate over the knowledge argument and the zombie conceivability 
argument don’t line up nicely if we do. Those who draw metaphysical conclusions from the 
knowledge argument and the zombie conceivability argument thereby rule out more standard forms 
of physicalism, but do not thereby rule out Strawson-style ‘physicalism’ (although of course they 
may dislike Strawson-style physicalism for other reasons). It makes things easier to call those who 
draw such metaphysical conclusions ‘anti-physicalists’, and their opponents ‘physicalists’. 
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I do not have space here to give a complete definition of physicalism, but I will stipulate that a 
‘physical’ property, although it may be identical with a phenomenal property, has a real nature 
which can be grasped in non-phenomenal/proto-phenomenal terms (according to the above 
definition of ‘proto-phenomenal’). Someone who believes in properties the real nature of which can 
only be grasped in phenomenal/proto-phenomenal terms does not count as a ‘physicalist’ by my 
lights. This is a terminological choice; the substantive point is that my argument is not aimed at the 
Russellian monist.19  
Objection: Dual revelation 
The PCS physicalist is most likely to respond to my argument by denying that we are really 
acquainted with our phenomenal qualities, but I have given considerable support to this premise of 
my argument. Their only other option as far as I can see is to deny premise 2 by accepting what I call 
‘dual revelation’: 
Dual revelation: For some property F, there are two conceptually distinct ways 
of knowing the real nature of F (i.e. knowing what it is for F to be 
instantiated.20 
If the CPS physicalist accepts dual revelation with respect to phenomenal qualities, they can claim 
that the real nature of pain is available both from completed brain science and from introspection, 
even though there is no conceptual connection between these two ways of understanding its nature. 
They could then deny premise 2: the real physical/functional nature of pain is not introspectively 
accessible, even though the real phenomenal nature with which that physical/functional nature is 
identical is introspectively accessible.21 
I find it difficult to make sense of dual revelation. Of course we can refer to a property in all sorts of 
ways: by description, by being causally connected to it, by possessing a concept the natural function 
of which is to track it. But it is quite another thing to suppose that we can understand the nature of a 
single property in two radically distinct ways. Certainly we don’t seem to be in a position of dual 
revelation with regards to the most uncontroversial cases of properties we have an understanding of 
the nature of. For an object to be spherical is for all points on its surface to be equidistant from its 
centre. For something to be a prime number is for it to be a number that can be divided only by itself 
                                                          
19
 I give a full definition of ‘physicalism’ in Goff MS. 
20
 In Goff 2011 I rather uncharitably called dual revelation ‘the Thesis of Dubious Intelligibility.’ 
21
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and two. There seems no way of specifying the essence of a sphere or a prime number in a radically 
different way, such that there is no possibility of deducing the radically new definition from the old 
one (or vice versa). 
To accept dual revelation is to accept that the world is, at least in some respects, radically 
unintelligible; there are some necessary connections which even a complete understanding of the 
world would not render intelligible. If there are such brute identities between, say, physical and 
mental properties, an omnipotent being with a complete understanding of the essence of pain and c-
fibres firing would be surprised that she were not able to create one without the other.  
I hasten to stress that I am not a supporter of the Chalmers/Jackson Canberra plan,22 according to 
which all facts are a priori derivable from the fundamental facts. It may be that our ordinary 
descriptions of the world are littered with radically opaque concepts; blind pointers which afford no 
understanding of the nature of the features they denote. In this case, our ordinary sentences may be 
made true by the real nature of the world, without having any conceptual connection with that real 
nature. If phenomenal concepts were radically opaque, then I would have no objection to PCS 
physicalism. But the idea that there could be brute necessary connections even between descriptions 
which render transparent real natures is to suppose that the world as it is in and of itself is in certain 
respects unintelligible.  
It will not be possible to build a completely satisfactory case for this thesis here,23 but I suspect that 
any metaphysical or scientific investigation of the world is reliant on the assumption that reality is 
not radically unintelligible in the way that dual revelation would imply. Metaphysical and scientific 
hypotheses must not just fit the evidence, but must fit the evidence in a theoretically satisfying way. 
However, to the extent that reality can be radically unintelligible, anything goes, and our ability to 
constrain metaphysical and scientific theories with respect to theoretical virtues and vices is severely 
limited. 
Consider the following example. Suppose I’m in a spooky forest, trying to decide whether or not I 
should believe in the spirit of the woodland, i.e. that beneficent spirit that lives in the trees and 
wishes them well. Imagine that I have some very weak reason to believe in the spirit of the 
woodland, perhaps some old wizened fellow wandered out of the forest and croaked in a mysterious 
voice, ‘Oooo there’s a spirit of the woodland in there me laddie.’ The stranger’s testimony, we can 
suppose, gives me a very weak reason to believe in the spirit of the woodland. 
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It is natural to think that this very weak reason is counterbalancing by the Ockhamist imperative not 
to add to our ontology without good reason. But if dual revelation is an option, I can believe in the 
woodland spirit without adding to my ontology, by identifying it with the bark of the trees. Of course 
there is no a priori connection between the scientific essence of bark, described as such, and the 
spirit of the woodland, described as a mental thing that cares about the forest and wishes it well. But 
I can claim that these are just two conceptually distinct ways of grasping the essence of a single 
thing. Without the constraint that identity statements couched in transparent (i.e. real nature 
revealing) concepts must be intelligible, it’s hard to see what I’m doing wrong. 
Wouldn’t this be to believe that there is more to the nature of bark; that as well as its scientific 
essence it has certain mental properties? No; the suggestion is that the scientific essence just is the 
mentally defined essence: we have two different ways of understanding exactly the same nature. Of 
course I don’t think this theory makes sense, because I don’t think dual revelation makes sense. But if 
dual revelation is an option then there seems to be no way of using Ockham’s razor to rule out the 
view. 
It’s not going to stop there. Dual revelation opens to door to all sorts of metaphysical indulgence that 
Ockham’s razor can’t touch: 
1. Suppose we think the normative force of genuine reasons cannot be captured in a 
naturalistic vocabulary. No worries, simply assert a brute identity between normative force 
and some natural property, e.g. identify not to be doneness with pain. We might even believe 
in real fire and brimstone moral properties, such as sin and evil, but just identify them with 
natural properties.24 
2. Suppose I believe in a world of quiddities, the nature of which can be completely captured in 
completely non-causal terms, but I’m worried that without real powers the continuing 
regularity of the world is just a massive cosmic coincidence.25 No worries, just take the 
utterly non-causal quiddity descriptions, and your favourite full-blooded powers description, 
and claim that these are just two radically different ways of understanding the same 
properties.26 
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3. Suppose you really want to believe in your guardian angel, ever near, loving you deeply. No 
worries; just identify her with your bedspread.27 
In all these cases, there is a strong intuition that there’s some cheating going on; ontology is being 
smuggled in without the proper price being paid for it. Perhaps the following analogy with tax 
avoidance is helpful. In tax avoidance, as opposed to evasion, one is sticking to the exact letter of the 
law whilst brazenly breaking its spirit. In the above cases the exact letter of Ockham’s razor may be 
being respected, but its spirit is not. 
It is not that there will be no constraint from theoretical virtues once we commit to dual revelation. It 
will still be the case, for example, that the theory of evolution fits the empirical data better than a 
literal interpretation of Genesis. However, there will be unlimited possibility for ‘adding’ numerous 
whacky entities to the world, by identifying their essences with the essences of things we already 
believe in. Rational investigation of the world relies on the assumption that the world is minimally 
intelligible.  
V – Conclusion 
We are really acquainted with the qualities of our experience. When I attend to the reddish quality 
in my experience, the real nature of that quality is apparent to me. Nothing less than a commitment 
to real acquaintance can explain both my certainty that I am experiencing a reddish quality, and my 
phenomenal insight into certain essential features of that quality, for example, that it is similar to 
the orange-ish quality I am also experiencing. If that reddish quality had a real physical nature, then 
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